Modern science admits two basic concepts of “ethnicity” as a phenomenon. Different notions of the correlation between ethnicity and economy correspond to them. The first point of view stipulates that ethnicity should be considered as intrinsic, even a biological property that predetermines the propensity of a person to enter into this or that sphere of economic activity. According to the second point of view suggesting the opposite, ethnicity is a construct created by the state, mass media, public opinion. It has been imposed on a person and symbolically attributes this or that economic niche to him/her. There is third point of view: ethnicity is one of the instruments or resources for achieving results in economic activity. In reality, this description of ethnicity is not an independent concept. Ethnicity can be an instrument both as an inherent property, and as a construct imposed from the outside.

The idea of “ethnicity as intrinsic property” has been prevalent in Russian science in recent decades. It remains very popular at present, especially among researchers dealing with empirical material, rather than among theorists. Such views form the basis of the “ethnos theory”, which was created in the 1960-80-ies in Soviet ethnography. According to this theory, “ethnicity” is a fundamental category of the individual as a social and even biological creature. Thus, any manifestation of human activity can be considered in an ethnic context.

In 1980-ies, numerous disciplines with the prefix “ethno- “ started to appear within the framework of “ethnos theory”: ethno-demography, ethno-history, ethno-geography etc. It was at that time that “ethno-economy” was declared to be a newly created discipline. Its point was to find an “ethnic” component in economic activity and to substantiate the autochthonal economic preferences of different “ethnoses”. In the context of “ethno-economy” the economic strategies of a person or a social group are predetermined by the ethno-cultural and ethno-social characteristics of the society to which they belong.

I use the case of Central Asia in an attempt to show the erroneousness of such statements. According to a number of researchers, the economic strategies of native inhabitants of Central Asia (Uzbeks, Tadjiks etc.) are inserted in a “traditional” model. This model supposes a strong influence of milieu upon a person's choice of “traditional”, i.e. characteristic for particular ethnic culture, spheres of professional activity such as agriculture, food and light industries etc.(Perepelkin, 1987). In contrast to the economic strategies of indigenous people, those of the Russian population of Central Asia refer to the contemporary model, which means independence from the opinions of other people and orientation to one's own interests. All this directly influences the choice of industrial, strongly mechanized and individualized professions.

In the literature relating to the present-day economy of Central Asia, one can often meet statements such as: “...the Uzbeks, by virtue of their tradition oriented towards small-scale commodity production and cotton-growing, neither had nor have any inclination for other occupations...” (Kultchik, 1995). Or another quotation: “...More attractive (for indigenous peoples of Central Asia - S.A.) were the spheres of economic activity, engagement in which contributed to preservation of traditional values and orientations, - it was agriculture, first of all” (Alexandrov, 1999).

These statements are based, in particular, on official statistics of population distribution by different branches of the national economy. Thus 40 % of the employed population in Uzbekistan work in agriculture, the same number - in the sphere of services, 20% - in industry and construction. In Turkmenistan - 44%, 40% and 16%, accordingly. The biggest proportion of people working in agriculture - 59% - is in Tadjikistan, including 27% in the sphere of services and 13% in industry and construction. In all republics, aboriginal population prevails in agriculture and the sphere of services, in contrast to industry and construction, where new comers from the European part of the former USSR prevail. Actually, the quota of indigenous peoples in industry is smaller than that in the national structure of the population. Thus, at the end of the 80-ies the quota of Uzbeks in industry of Uzbekistan equaled 53%, in construction - 50%, in transport and communication - 55%, whereas the quota of Uzbeks in the total population exceeded 70%. In Turkmenistan, the quotas of Turkmenians in the afore mentioned branches amounted to 53%, 54% and 48%, accordingly, the proportion of Turkmenians in the total population exceeding 75%. In Tadjikistan, the corresponding proportions of Tadjiks were as follows: 48%, 48% and 57%, the quota of Tadjiks in total population exceeded 65% (the numerous Uzbek community is not taken into account in this case). These data are usually interpreted as evidence of the “ethnic” preferences of different nations.

In my opinion, the phenomenon of relative, but not absolute, statistical correlation between “nationality” and the “sphere” of national economy is entirely unconnected “ethnic” or “traditional” preferences. This is the result of a quite concrete socio-economic and political choice, which was made in the 20th century. I will single out one of the consequences of this choice. To ensure economic independence for the USSR, the Soviet government was consciously ready to establish a cotton monopoly in Central Asia. Unlike, for example, grain farming, cotton-growing requires great labour outlays, therefore the Central Asian population was retained in rural areas by various compulsory measures. All Central Asian industry and urban culture were also created by means of the compulsory displacement of the people from the European part of the USSR, where these people, apropos, were just being released from agriculture. In other words, the state provided conditions for the conservation of one group in the “agrarian” sector and for rapid migration of another group from the “agrarian” sector to “industrial” one. The situation which at present is considered as an indicator of “ethnic” distinctions, has developed only in the 20^th century and even more recently - in post-war years, i.e. in 1940-1970-ies. It was the very time when mutual stereotypes interpreted as “national” (or “ethnic”) were forming, and either a “traditional” or a “modern” character was being attributed to economic strategies. The Uzbeks, Tadjiks and other peoples of Central Asia became “backward”, “traditional”. They are regarded as adherents of “collectivism”, who are deeply attached to the land. In other words, they accepted all those characteristics which as far back as 20-30-ies, could be applied to Russians, Ukrainians etc., as to the French and Germans at the end of the last century.

In fact, the present situation in Central Asia has fundamentally changed in comparison to the situation encountered two or three decades ago. The figures showing the distribution of Central Asian population by branches of national economy today conceal quite a different reality. Closer study of employment shows that the data on people engaged in agriculture are of a rather fictitious character.

I will cite data related to the “Mindon” unitary area. It is a populated locality situated in the Fergana valley. At the beginning of 1991, the “Mindon” population ran to 11 thousand, including around 5 thousand people who were considered to be able-bodied. About 2,7 thousand people among these five thousand were officially employed at the local collective farm “Dimitrov”. In 1990, about 200 people formally registered as collective farmers did not work there a single day. In other words, 2,5 thousand people worked on the collective farm in fact, that makes 50% of the able-bodied population of “Mindon” unitary area. About 2 thousand collective farmers were registered as members of cotton-growing brigades, i.e. they worked directly in agriculture. The rest (500 people) belonged to managerial personnel, technical workers, the staff of kindergartens and nurseries etc. What is most curious is that among two thousand members of cotton-growing brigades only 60 persons worked more than 300 days per year. Others had fewer working days: 600 people worked less than 50 days per year. The overwhelming majority of the collective farmers were engaged in collective-farm production not more than 2-3 months per year. The rest of time these “workers” of agrarian sector did not work anywhere, or were partially engaged in individual farming, or unofficially worked in various non-agrarian branches.

Another argument for the adherence of the aboriginal population of Central Asia to agrarian production is the important role played by the household plot of land in providing the family income. There is an opinion that work on a plot “...gives the family an income exceeding its earnings in the public sector...” (Alexandrov, 1991); villagers in Central Asia “...do not have ...any other sources of existence...” except for six or eight 'sotka's of land (a hundredth of ha) (Kultchik, 1995); “... The individual farm in Central Asia has practically become the main source of income for a considerable part of the population...” (Tcheshko, 1990).

Also in regard to this matter, researchers quite often operate with stereotypes instead of facts. Agricultural production has natural limits of growth. At the end of the last century, one individual farm in Mindon controlled approximately 5-6 Hectares of all irrigated lands, including private and collective-farm ones. Even one takes into account the increase of profitability per unit of irrigated area, it is obvious that opportunities to earn a living in agrarian production have been gradually narrowed for the last 100 years. It means that at present the population is forced to search for work outside Mindon. The structure of incomes of one Uzbek family (6-7 persons) at the beginning of 1990-ies looked approximately as follows: income from household plot and domestic crafts (animal husbandry, sericulture) made 35-45%, the same accounted for incomes from “social production” (including 15% in collective-farm production and 20-30% in other branches); social welfare and private earnings made up the rest.

Characterizing the family budget, one should take into account not only how income is made up, but also economic behaviour of the people and the motives behind their economic activity. In the past all economic life was associated with land: landless and land-poor people tried to spend the money they earned for renting land and for further purchases of the latter, in order to become land owners. At present, the situation differs. A person who has a stable source of income outside agriculture, has no desire at all to invest all the money in purchasing land and getting involved in agricultural production.

The facts cited, in my opinion, prove that at present the indigenous peoples of Central Asia no longer have a limited number of professions related to agriculture that does not exist any more. Thus, there are no “traditional” or “ethnic” economic niches which the native population aspires to occupy according to “ethno-cultural” motivation.

The above facts prove that “ethnic” distinctions in Central Asia are gradually being obliterated. This process is connected with the changing socio-economic and political situation in today's Central Asia. Between 1970 and 1980 the cotton monopoly was gradually disappearing, agrarian overcrowding reached an extreme and the aboriginal population of Central Asia started “leaving” the agrarian sector for other branches of the national economy, the Russian-speaking population started departing and so on.

At the same time, the new “ethnic” distinctions were developing rather beyond the borders of Central Asia. They are connected with substantial changes in economic strategies of indigenous Central Asian peoples. In particular, the migration flow of the Central Asian population to Russia increases. By this, I mean, in particular, the seasonal migration. Official statistics hardly register this form of migration, thus the latter stay beyond the researchers' “field of vision”. According to some estimations, up to one third of the adult male population of Tadjikistan annually go in search of paid work outside the republic. The same process is developing in Uzbekistan and in other regions of Central Asia.

In Russian society migrants occupy the niches created by the economic situation in Russia. This relates, first of all, to trade and the service sector which are the most profitable sectors of the economy. In addition, many comers from Central Asia are engaged in rapidly developing construction. A certain number of Central Asian migrants find jobs in industry, oil and gas-fields. Criminality, mainly drug trafficking, is most attractive for migrants. I would like to emphasize once again - the above mentioned economic niches are most profitable and are occupied by migrants from Transcaucasia, Moldova, Ukraine, Byelorussia and even by those from more distant countries - Korea, China, Vietnam.

I did not conduct any special research on the position of migrants from Central Asia in Russia. I could, however, present some ideas on ethnicity in the context of new economic strategies of native Central Asian peoples. This might be of some interest to those who investigate the Central Asian inhabitants outside Central Asia.

There is a concept that asserts ethnic preferences in economic sphere to be stipulated by “cultural comfort”, easier mutual understanding within particular “ethnos”, by certain “clan” obligations, corporate interests which prevail over a person etc. All this seems to predetermine a preference for compatriots when forming economic niches with the regard for “ethnic factor”. Actually, it is the very “instrumentalism” which was spoken of above, though presented by the supporters of the “intrinsic ethnicity” concept.

Such reasoning, however, incompletely reflects the reality. The terms “mutual understanding”, “comfort”, “clan” are taken from quasi-scientific romanticism or acute political publicism rather than from the arsenal of modern scientific concepts. A person quite often avoids his/her “owns” and prefers to cooperate with “aliens”, with whom he/she is not bound with any additional obligations and with whom it is easier to achieve the results. In any event, the thesis about the homogeneous national structure of “ethnic groupings” has long belonged to myth and does not reflect the real state of things. As it is well known, despite their “ethic name”, these groupings are sure to join representatives of different nationalities, including those of the country or region where the group in question acts.

On the other hand, even when the grouping is perceived as one’s “own”, the perception is stipulated by kinship, commune and religious factors, rather than by ethnic ones. “Ethnic” character is more often ascribed to these groups from outside, i.e. by the social environment in which they were placed. In this case, the question should be put as follows: why are “ethnic” definitions used in Russia for naming migrants? I am convinced that the problems of “ethnicity and economy”, “ethnicity and criminality” should be studied in the context of the formation of ideology in the present-day Russian bureaucracy, including, for example, the militia, special services etc.

There is another curious phenomenon to be singled out. Central Asian migrants often conceal their own nationality, ascribing the other ethnicity to themselves. One should remark that national or ethnic self-consciousness in Central Asia is a late phenomenon. Actually it was formed in the 20^th century. Formerly the local population was characterized by multistage, hierarchic self-consciousness where tribal, regional, sectarian and social identities got mixed up. Up to now, many groups perceive themselves as depending on situation; either as Tadjiks or Uzbeks, Turkmenians or Uzbeks, Kirghiz or Uzbeks and so on. Bi- or trilingualism (if we take into account the Russian language, formerly spread on a large scale) are kept up. Besides, if we consider personalized relationships, it is the origin of a person that is of importance for Central Asian inhabitants, not the nationality which is written down in his/her passport.

The most obvious reason for concealing one's own ethnicity is a wish to keep up one's trade mark. In Russia, for instance, it is usual to say “Uzbek plov”, though not only Uzbeks cook pilaw. Similar examples are “Uzbek cuisine”, “Uzbek tiubeteika (skull-cap)”, “Uzbek melons” (or “melons from Tashkent”, though those melons were not brought from Tashkent at all) and so on. A wish to maintain a positive image of this or that nationality might be another reason for concealing one's ethnicity. The most famous case is connected with Central Asian Gypsies, who played the role of Tadjik refugees. One can assume, that Uzbeks, Arabs and other minor national groups from Tadjikistan have also called themselves Tadjiks. It was useful at one time, when the attitude to refugees from Tadjikistan in Russia was sympathetic.

Thanks to newspapers and law-enforcement agencies, a negative image of the Tadjik-drugdealer has been created. I remember one provocative incident that I saw on TV. On “TV-6” channel's program “Road Patrol”, a high-ranking militiaman had this to to say about the matter: very soon, all Tadjiks will be imprisoned for drug-trafficking. It is obvious that the Tadjiks of Uzbekistan, for example, will prefer to call themselves Uzbeks, so as not to be associated with such a deeply negative image. In these cases, adoption of ethnicity is merely a way to avoid any unpleasant consequences that might result from the negative image of this or that nationality in Russia. Many more such examples could be adduced.

Summarizing, I would like to emphasize once again that the concept of “intrinsic ethnicity”, which we regard as rather logical and natural, disintegrates on closer inspection. More convincing, in my opinion, is the concept of “constructing ethnicity”. I will cite some basic aspects of this concept.

First – an individual has a complex self-consciousness incorporating a number of different identities, which he/she can choose, change, or even create. A person is not intrinsically ascribed to any “nationality”. Second - the interpretation of “ethnicity” changes over time. The epoch changes, as well as the conditions of life, and the content of any “ethnic self-consciousness” concept also changes. Third - the process by which “ethnicity” is formed is strongly affected by the state, mass media and stereotypes from everyday life. Researchers involved in study of the creation or “constructing” of “ethnicity” are themselves not far removed from it. This means, that the science bears responsibility for all it does. However, it is a topic for another discussion.

Kultchik, Ju. (1995) Respublika Uzbekistan v seredine 90-h godov // Issledovaniya po prikladnoi i neotlozhnoi etnologii. Dokument N 90. Ìoskva

Alexandrov, Ju. (1999) Byvshii Sovetskii Vostok // Sotsialnyi oblik Vostoka. Ìoskva

Cheshko, S.V. (1990) Tsentralnaya Asia i Kazakhstan: sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy natsionalnogo razvitiya // Rasy i narody. Vyp. 20. Ìoskva