It is widely known the kind of serious difficulties of adaptation millions of Russians and Russian-speakers have been facing in the newly independent states (NIS) after the break-up of the USSR. In the eyes of many academics, the mass media and public opinion, the main cause of these difficulties is derived from the fact that all the “compatriots” are Russians whereas power is concentrated in the hands of the titular ethnic groups – the Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Estonians, etc. So, the roots of existing tensions and conflicts have been taken as “ethnic”, as conflicts between ethnic groups. Not surprisingly the terms “ethnic” and “ethnicity” have been the favorites in the vocabulary of the bulk of publications devoted to “Russians outside Russia” (ethnic discomfort, ethnic discrimination, ethnic migration, etc.).

However, another interpretation might also be relevant: what looks on the surface like “ethnic” confrontation is to a large extent a conflict of social groups engendered by a radical redistribution of power and the restructuring of the Soviet socio-political hierarchy.

In the period of the Russian and mainly Soviet Empire Russians, together with members of other ethnic groups falling within the category of Russian-speakers, not only made up the backbone of local industries, education services, health services, etc., but were also the bearers of the center’s ideology and policies. The Russians’ leading position at all levels of the ruling structures had been thus predetermined. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation changed radically – Russian-speakers have found themselves at the lower and sometimes the lowest levels of the socio-political pyramid, with all the obvious losses to their status and welfare. The above-proposed “non-ethnic” interpretation of the causes and consequences of these losses is most applicable, in my opinion, to the situation in Central Asia – the “imperial” balance of power was here supplemented by the “senior and junior brothers” complex still alive in the public mind.

An important “formal” argument is worth mentioning which questions the correctness of treating the factor of “ethnicity” as the core factor in the relationship of the new states with the Russian-speakers residing on their territory. In strict terms, the latter is not an ethnic group but, if Central Asia is taken as an example, a conglomeration of communities with many rapidly changing identities. Elements of “Soviet” identity go hand in hand with Russianism (obruseniye) which is manifesting itself in these people’s adherence to Russian culture and a perception of Russian as their mother-tongue. At the same time, the revival of ethnic values in the post-Soviet period has been contributing, for non-Russians in the first instance, to a growth of ethnic aspirations on the emotional level and/or to a highly rationalized construction of ethnicity (for Germans and Jews). So, given the Russian-speakers’ community in terms of past and present social roles and interests, it could be more correct to take them as an ethno-social group alienated from power by the ruling regime, which is represented mainly by the titular ethnos.

It is hardly important for ordinary people in what capacity they are at risk of being discriminated against. However, if scholarly expertise and political decisions are concerned, the proposed “non-ethnic” approach looks more productive than an emphasis on a clash of exclusively ethnic interests. First, this allows the avoidance of politicization of the public discourse on the “compatriots issue” being severely influenced by parties of nationalist orientation. Second, similar to any other situation when a conflict of interests can be rationalized, a good opportunity opens for “bargaining” in order to establish mutually accepted rules of the game both at the inter-state, inter-group and inter-personal level. Third, the problems of Russian-speakers in the NIS, which are hardly of a unique character, could be treated within the much wider context of the transformation of post-Soviet societies, and through this lens the factor of ethnicity, playing some role on every territory including Russia itself, will turn into just one of the components of a painful adaptation process.

The following is an attempt to apply the above-mentioned considerations to how the economic integration of Russian-speakers’ has been developing, if at all, in post-Soviet Kirghizia. The paper is based on empirical research conducted in 1996, 1998 and 1999 (surveys of the Russian-speakers in Bishkek, expert interviews and in-depth interviews with the so called successful integrators).

Little is known about the lives of Russian-speakers in the near abroad, and this is in striking contrast with the scale of sociological study of adaptation modes in post-Soviet Russia. Though out-migration from the NIS has considerably slowed down in recent years, Russian scholars, as well as the press, still link Russian-speakers’ living conditions to the migration process. Research interest focuses on potential migrants and, putting it in a more generalized way, on the push factors (ethnic in the first turn) and disintegration trends in the Russian-speaking communities. The so called “migration approach” dominates political and academic thinking, by which Russian-speakers have no future in these areas. Grounds for this conceptual bias are numerous and deserve special consideration. I should mention the lack of funds for extensive field-work; serious underdevelopment of qualitative sociology and, due to this, emphasis on survey methods; prevalence of primordialist concepts of ethnicity and, last but not least, the high political sensitivity of the research issues under consideration.

In accordance with the “migration approach”, the Russian-speakers of the NIS are not living a normal life but are just living out their days there, with practically no chances for economic integration and social promotion. To illustrate this, the following example will be relevant in this article devoted to Kirghizia. This is how G. Pyadukhov, a Kirghizstani analyst, commented at the Moscow Carnegie Centre seminar on the tangible slowing down of migration to Russia: “Everybody who could leave, who had money, relatives, connections, – they have already left. Those who have stayed are mostly old people or poor families without any resources for resettlement. Successful integration is open only for that tiny per cent of Russian-speakers who flourish in business. Migration expectations are still very high” (Sotsialno-politicheskaya, 1997). It is worth noting here that no empirical grounds for this conclusion were presented, nor can it be supported by any of my own field-work material.

What is described by G. Pyadukhov is really a perspective of the Russian-speakers’ hopeless marginalization, and “business prosperity” is not used quite correctly here as a measure of success. Business is a risky sphere of activity, and not so many people “flourish” in it even in highly developed economies, not to say transitional post-Soviet societies. That is why, in my opinion, “success” and “career” should be treated in broad terms – the starting positions of former Soviet citizens have been greatly undermined by the collapse of the socialist economies and by the instability of those societies they are living in now. Thus, it is not the ‘fantastic flight’ of the so called new Russians which is meant by “success” but the lack of a humiliating dependency on the poor state “pocket” and the materialization in “acceptable” living standards of those new rights and liberties provided by the market. In this respect, a more reliable criteria of “successful integration” to be applied to the post-Soviet states should be the following: personal satisfaction with the job available and/or family well-being, an optimistic estimate of family economic perspectives, perception of life conditions as “settled” (ustroyennaya zhizn’). Respectively, upward social mobility under these conditions should not only be taken as Soviet-like promotion (salaries of school director or head physician do not differ much from those of an ordinary teacher or doctor), but, in the first instance, employment in the organized private sector, even if this demands, not infrequently, a drastic change of profession and type of activity.

Turning to the empirical data, I would like to emphasize that the Russian-speaking community of Kirghizia is rapidly differentiating according to a wide range of characteristics of “being”, “consciousness” and behaviour. A visible line, for instance, divides those “willing to stay” (these are people who have consciously chosen to stay in Kirghizia, and they are far from being in a minority) and “willing to leave”(these are people who would prefer migration to Russia but have not got adequate resources for resettlement). Thus, the first group members are not only more positive in their evaluation of their family’s material status, both in terms of the past and the future, but are also more optimistic about the country’s economic future which is perceived through the prism of personal gains and losses (see Appendix, table 1). Similarly, there exists a tangible gap between the groups in the share of respondents who felt (or had felt before) discriminated on ethnic grounds : 20.2 per cent among those “willing to stay” and 29.3 per cent among those “willing to leave” in 1996 and, respectively, 16.6 and 47.1 per cent in 1998.

Responses to a similar question, though not appealing directly to people’s personal experience, are also illustrative (see Appendix, table 2). The question was put in the following way: “What is most important, in your opinion, to make material and social gains in modern Kirghizia?” The majority of respondents consider “money” (57.5 per cent) and “connections” (56.0 per cent) as crucial factors of life “success”; these ideas are very close, as results of a survey in Rybinsk testify, to mass perceptions of “success” and “social security” in modern Russia. A factor of an ethnic nature (“to be Kirghiz”) is mentioned much less frequently (32.6 per cent); moreover, reactions of those “willing to stay” are more biased towards a non-ethnic interpretation of “success”: in their opinion, the major role, besides “money” and “connections”, is played by good education (32.1 per cent against 20.0 per cent of those “willing to leave”); only 23.0 per cent of the “stay group” members admit the importance of being Kirghiz (in comparison with almost twice this number amongst members of the “leave group”). “Good proficiency in Kirghiz” is also taken by the first group as an important resource for promotion (20.9 per cent against 9.5 per cent for those “willing to leave”), a result being quite explicable by their integration intentions. Interestingly enough, none of the thirty two respondents who have chosen option “other” (almost all of them want to stay in Kirghizia) have presented ethnically-oriented arguments; in contrast, they mentioned the skills and talents which are in demand under the market economy (“the main thing is the strong intention to work”; “you should have a good head on your shoulders”; “to be a professional in your business”, etc.).

Strictly speaking, all this illustrates quite a trivial thing: the realities of life are perceived differently by people depending on their individual socio-demographic status and material well-being, on the psychological traits of their personality, social capital accumulated, etc., etc. These “life realities” embrace, among others, the ethnic composition of society and the role played by ethnic differences. Undoubtedly, under extraordinary circumstances like an acute phase of inter-ethnic conflict, ethnicity turns into a main regulator of peoples’ attitudes and behaviour. However, under normal societal conditions, let it be an ethnocratic society, the factor of ethnic affiliation starts to loose its predominating and self-sufficing importance. This tendency manifests itself in a subjective perception of the “ethnic” which has been shown above; another manifestation lies in the selectivity of the impact of ethnicity on people’s (Russian-speakers in our case) behaviour in general and on their adaptive strategies in particular, and it provides certain perspectives for their “success” through entering already existing economic niches and/or the formation of new ones. This is also demonstrated by the Russian-speakers’ experiences in Kirghizia.

The post-independence period has witnessed a sharp redistribution of economic and political power between the two major ethno-social groups. The policy of ousting “Russians” from administrative and managerial positions and other spheres where they had dominated (health protection, education, culture, etc.) intensified sharply. Nowadays the access of non-Kirghiz to cushy jobs in the state sector (banks, tax and customs services, state apparatus, legal system, internal affairs) is seriously restricted. It is in this very area where discrimination against the Russian-speakers is most sharply felt. The majority of those respondents who reported infringement along ethnic lines (slightly above a quarter in both samples) and then replied to an open-ended question about the causes and manifestations of discrimination, mentioned barriers to social promotion, inadequate estimates of their professional skills, difficulties in getting a well-paid and prestigious job.

Nevertheless, the ethnic overtones of these changes and their scale should not be absolutized. What is often overlooked is that the dramatic fall of living standards of the post-Soviet states population has been provoked mainly by the “shock” character of the market reforms, which has been aggravated for Russian-speakers by the collapse of the huge military-industrial complex in the NIS where they dominated. In this light, the economic hardships of the ordinary people in Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, etc., let them be Kirghiz, Russians, Kazakhs or Ukrainians, – do not differ much from those of the bulk of Russian families. Moreover, returning to the present situation in Kirghizia, the regime has reached a certain saturation limit of its power (though different in every sphere of socio-economic activity), followed by an understanding about what scale of ousting Russian-speakers would be reasonable, especially from lower and medium-level positions of power. Thus, empirical data testifies that non-Kirghiz are not met less frequently in these positions than Kirghiz, and that many Russian-speaking bosses work in the state sector of economy.

My research findings suggest that, as far as Russian-speakers are concerned, a kind of rationalised system of norms, unwritten rules and newly-born traditions has gradually appeared, similar in some sense to that much more rigid scheme of roles’ distribution which existed in the Soviet Union (the first boss is “local”, his/her deputy is Russian). Certainly, how this system is functioning in the relatively “closed” state sector differs substantially from its manifestations in the relatively “open” private sector of economy. In view of the limited volume of the paper, just a few examples will be presented, although there are plenty of them.

One of the interviewees (metis) who held a high position in the Ministry of the Interior for some time after independence, but was a professional pensioner at the time of interviewing, told about his attempts to push one of his former subordinates (Russian) up to a position of deputy head of the ministry department. The boss whom he addressed replied that this step would not be “accepted” as one of his deputies was Russian and the head of the most important affiliation was Russian as well.

Another example touches upon the competition between Russians and Kirghiz for prestigious jobs in the private sector. One of the experts, a well-known linguist (Kirghiz) complained that her nephew who had graduated from the Turkish university and had been fluent in English, Turkish and, certainly, Russian, could not find a good job in the “firm”. The main problem was his poor command of the Kirghiz language. In response to my question: “But what should Russians do under these conditions?”, she replied “The demands they should satisfy are quite different”.

Here is a more general characteristic of the new tendencies in the labour market presented by the “Res Publica” newspaper issued in Bishkek: “Many so called “new Kirghiz” lost a lot of money at the start of their business through placing relatives at the key positions in their firms and companies. But you will get nothing out of your kinsmen – neither can action be brought against them, nor racketeers sent to collect debts. The barriers do not exist between relatives which should naturally divide a boss and subordinate. That is why the employers prefer to hire professionals nowadays”.

The above-described tendencies developing from above, are going hand in hand with the efforts Russian-speakers are developing themselves from below. The private sector which is not so strictly politicised has been serving as the main domain for these activities. This concerns not only the so called “shuttle” trade, a risky and unstable business, but first of all “organised” business requiring a high standard of education and professional skills. A part of the Russian-speakers did not miss their chance. For instance, as the survey results of 1996 indicate, one of the essential differences between those men “who wanted to stay” and those who “wanted to leave” was in how they adapted in the troubled period of socio-economic transition. Thus, compared with the “leave group”, amongst men who “wanted to stay” almost two times less were not satisfied with their jobs and two times more were employed in the “organised” private sector with relatively high and regularly paid salaries. Of course, only a few people become owners of a big and prosperous business, especially as business activities are developing under the conditions of a “wild” post-Soviet market. However, according to estimates of the above-mentioned interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior, Russian-speakers comprise about a third of the hundred “big” businessmen working in Bishkek. Here is another estimate, concerning small and medium-size businesses. Twenty nine firms out of fifty turned out to be run by Russian-speakers and to have a majority of Russians in their staff in a random sample of private enterprises selected from those advertising their activities in Bishkek newspapers (autumn 1999).

The complicated and contradictory collisions of the socio-economic promotion of Russian-speakers in the NIS should, certainly, undergo further extensive research; nevertheless, the presented empirical data and conceptual considerations provide, in my view, adequate testimony that a totally pessimistic approach, and linking analysis only (or basically) to the ethnic factor, are hardly relevant here.

Table 1. Russian-Speakers in Bishkek: Living Standards’ Dynamics in the Post-Soviet Period (estimates of respondents “willing to stay” and “willing to leave”), %, 1998

Òàble 2. Russian-Speakers in Bishkek: Views of Crucial Factors of Socio-Economic Promotion,

%, 1998

What is most important, in your opinion, to make material and social gains in
modern Kirghizia?

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Kosmarskaya, N. (1999b) “Russkie v Tsentralnoi Azii” - bolnoi vopros? Naskolko i dlya kogo? // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. ¹ 5(6). P. 31– 34

Sotsialno-politicheskaya (1997) situatsiya i polozhenie novykh diaspor v Kazakhstane i Kirgizii: vzglyad ottuda. Biblioteka Moskovskogo tsentra Karnegi. SM-Mig/97-2. P. 14