Regional transboundary co-operation within Europe has received considerable support as a promoter of political and economic interdependence. The strategies through which this support has been marshalled are both material and discursive in nature and stress such concepts as "regionalisation" and "institutionalisation". Within this context, Euroregions, local expressions of formal transboundary co-operation, have been systematically established as a means of assuring continuity and strategic direction in co-operation.

Euroregions were pioneered and perfected in Dutch-German border regions in the 1970s and 80s, an area known for "institutional thickness" in transboundary planning and environmental protection. The main goal of the Euroregions is to gain acceptance as a focal point for binational initiatives that address specific economic, environmental, social and institutional problems affecting their respective regions. These associations, many with cross-border local "parliaments", represent an additional tier of regional "administration" and play a vital role in channeling European regional development aid into the border regions. Research indicates, however, that Euroregions have as yet only met with qualified success in achieving many of their ambitious aims. Despite generous project-oriented subsidies, true co-operation has developed only in certain areas of social communication and interaction. Indeed, the experiences of most European border regions have shown that the involvement of the private sector in transboundary co-operation activities is notoriously limited and/or difficult to stimulate.

In studying Euroregions it is therefore necessary to differentiate between intentional policies, self-promotional rhetoric and actual co-operation experiences. It is, indeed, the latter that provides more sensitive criteria for judging co-operative efforts rather than a priori defined regional development concepts or planning initiatives. Ultimately, Euroregions can only function as "bridges" of communication if they succeed in building social capital in the form of trust and through routinising interaction. As such, the study of Euroregions highlights the necessity of integrative frameworks for comparative research on transboundary interaction. This paper will briefly discuss the rhetorical logic underlying support for Euroregions and how this conflicts with actual co-operation experiences. Considering that the actual added value of Euroregions may lie less in the systematic achievement of ambitious regional development goals as in the promotion of dialogue and institutional innovation. In closing, an alternative conceptual basis for the study of Euroregions will be proposed.

Analyses of border region interaction and transboundary regionalism have heretofore been largely fragmented, focusing on a wide variety of disparate issues including functional aspects (borders as "filtres", "gateways", "zones of integration", etc.), models of economic rationality, transaction costs of co-operation and/or ethnographically oriented case studies. In order to understand how different economic, cultural and political "variables" condition transboundary co-operation at the regional and local levels, it appears that comparative analytical frameworks based on exploratory characterisations of transboundary co-operation contexts and processes are needed. Thus, transboundary interaction can be characterised by quantifiable activities and flows as well as by documentable attitudes and orientations of transboundary actors ("frames of reflection" in the sense of Schoen and Rein (1994)) and their co-operation experiences. Similarly, co-operation between cities as embodied by networks and strategic alliances can be characterised according to the actors involved, the issues they emphasise and the strategies they employ with which to realise common objectives. These must, however, be put into perspective with other factors that include "environmental" (e.g. overlying economic, political, attitudinal, cultural) factors, actor-specific characteristics (e.g. jurisdictions/authority, institutional affiliations, responsibilities, accountability, resources, objectives), strategic orientations of co-operation (such as, premises, priorities, goals, types of initiatives and projects) and parameters of co-operation experience (including conflictual aspects, aspects promoting consensus, perceived barriers to co-operation). Finally, national and European policies that affect local/regional transboundary co-operation must be taken into account.

The starting point for our discussion is the often-stated premise that economic synergy effects and more effective policy-making can be achieved through eliminating communication barriers posed by national boundaries. Transboundary regionalism, as a potentially new form of governance within Europe, is informed by theoretical and political debate that imbue the issue of cross-border and transnational co-operation with programmatic, even normative, qualities. We can define transboundary regionalism as a spatially integrated form of political co-operation and problem-solving that transcends the limits of nationally-based administrative practice and attempts to create (or re/create, as the case might be) a sense of cohesiveness, interdependence and common interests across national boundaries. Transnational regionalism signifies the emergence of Ivo Duchacek's "subnational paradiplomacy" on a large scale and in very different geographical contexts. It is much more than a response to the new territorial (network) logic of economic activity or to globalised markets. It is also a product of interdependence and the limited response capabilities of nation-states and international organisations (the UN, in particular) to address global concerns (Young, 1997). Transnational regionalism is thus also driven by a desire to develop new, more responsive and effective forms of collective action – or governance in protecting the environment, safeguarding peaceful co-existence and promoting economic development. Furthermore, the demand for "governance" and "governability" in these areas is steadily increasing.

If we also consider strategic interests of the EU, especially the promotion of greater economic and political interdependence as a precondition for political stability in Europe, we can identify a powerful rationale for formalising local and regional transboundary co-operation. Indeed, it appears that a model of multilevel institutionalisation, perfected in West European border regions, has been transferred to the EU's borders with Central and Eastern Europe as part of a pre-integration policy to combat regional margination and facilitate a long-term basis for co-operation. Together with generous project incentives financed out of European structural and economic co-operation funds, this "model" theoretically constitutes a powerful framework (regime) for the development of new policy-making capacities across national boundaries.

From both a practical and academic perspective the complex process of European integration and expansion has helped draw attention to border regions as zones of interstate interaction. National markets are being incorporated into a much larger European economic space while new subnational markets will develop, reflecting the enhanced functional and cultural importance of regions.

The strategic considerations informing EU support of transboundary co-operation are many and include: the opening of new markets, the maintenance of European security interests and general political stability, economic cohesion and viability, the avoidance of negative social consequences of greater competition between regions and, as a prelude to the accession of Eastern European states, the improvement of national/regional economies in post-socialist transition. In achieving these objectives, institution-building is encouraged through the establishment of various intergovernmental bodies with the express duty of co-ordinating transboundary co-operation activities. The creation of Euroregions, transboundary associations of local governments (cities and counties), is particularly encouraged.

Exhaustive appraisals of the results of transboundary co-operation in Europe are difficult due to the vast number of border region initiatives either completed or in realisation. However, the well-documented experiences of transboundary associations in the Benelux countries and the Dutch-German border regions, as well as those of asymmetric regions, such as in the German-Polish context, might serve as a measurement. Based on these experiences we can arrive at several general conclusions:

1. co-operation between representatives of public agencies, universities and, to a lesser extent, non-profit organisations has been generally successful in relatively straightforward projects of clear but limited focus in areas such as: environmental protection (creating transboundary parklands and nature reserves), transportation infrastructure, vocational training, cultural activities, and public agency networking;
1. the encouragement of private-sector networking and investment as well as effective transboundary co-ordination of land-use plans and urban development remains elusive. Co-operation incentives and the establishment of business information centres have proven insufficient in changing nationally-focused investment behaviour and interfirm networking even in such culturally homogeneous border regions (North Belgium and Southern Holland);
1. local patriotism has resisted most attempts to "regionalise" local land-use and growth management policies insofar as they affect housing, industrial and commercial development, even though a small number of Dutch-German industrial parks are in operation.

Experiences of German-Polish transboundary regionalism deserve mention in their own right. These parallel to an extent the Dutch-German and Benelux cases; project-oriented public-sector co-operation in environmental protection (e.g. binational sewage treatment plants) and higher education (the Europa-University complex in Frankfurt and Slubice) have produced tangible results while transboundary economic development projects involving the private sector have languished. Admittedly, German-Polish co-operation operates under more difficult circumstances that those prevailing in the Dutch-German case. Reasons:

1. extreme disparities in government resources at the national, regional and local levels have made for highly unequal relationships in dealing with matters of transboundary importance;
1. contradictions between Germany's federalist traditions - which the new German states have adopted since 1990 - and a rather accentuated centralism in Poland;
1. slow development of effective local self-government in Poland and the former East Germany.

Most damningly, despite their membership in Euroregions, most municipalities in the German-Polish border regions have failed to establish more effective transboundary partnerships with their counterparts, leaving this, in effect, to the Euroregion central offices. As a result, EU funds are often merely viewed as additional local revenues rather than as genuine co-operation incentives. Also, interagency conflicts over resource allocation, particularly within the German state governments, have worked against the co-ordination of regional development initiatives earmarked for the border region.

Despite undeniable successes, Euroregions have clearly not automatically guaranteed the establishment of new public and private sector alliances to address regional and local development issues. European experience would also seem to indicate that, ironically, border region policies have maintained an administrative, top-down and bureaucratic character that as yet has not sufficiently encouraged citizen action and public-sector participation particularly in areas characterised by stark socio-economic asymmetries, such the German-Polish border region.

In view of these observations, we return to the theoretical considerations outlined above. Indeed, the emergence of transboundary urban networks as exemplified by Euroregions produces many more questions than answers. Do we see the development of genuine communities of interest that reflect local situations and local needs? Do these networks indeed represent (or potentially represent) a new dimension in governance, surmounting administrative, cognitive, cultural and physical barriers to co-operation and also producing tangible policy results? Or, is transboundary networking rather a symbolic gesture of "Europeanness" and/or only a means for obtaining European structural development assistance?

An important aspect of network-based co-operation that directly applies to transboundary co-operation in Europe is the promotion of new planning forms in which social and political mobilisation and policy discourse are emphasised (see Healy, 1997). As a result, the establishment of a planning process as regional dialogue, together with strategies to reconcile and co-ordinate diverse interests, would also appear to offer considerable promise for developing transboundary alliances between cities and their regions (van Geenhuizen et. al., 1996). Often forgotten, however, is the contextual environment for alliance-building across national borders. Not only are financial incentives and legal frameworks important but the actors themselves must have the capacity to promote a discursive policy-development process.

Hence, the integrative role of elites and the mobilising potential of a sense of "Civic Entrepreneurship" cannot be underestimated (see Henton et. al., 1997 for an interesting discussion of this concept). Euroregions can, with some justification, be seen as promoters of greater political integration and local level co-operation in solving day-to-day problems. They have not, however, been able to assume a similar role in promoting economic development or regional development in general, although this is one of their primary (and self-defined) goals. One of the results of research carried out by the IRS is the fact that the work of the Euroregions could be considerably enhanced via strategic management and the creation of public value. This would require the development of "boosterist" strategies and an entrepreneurial spirit with regard to co-operation. In many transboundary regional contexts however, this attitude is not evident at the municipal level as traditional hierarchies, divisions of responsibilities and outmoded concepts of public service persist.

Prospects for transboundary regionalisation will be defined by the outcomes of a gradual and complex process of institutional innovation and capacity-building at national, state and local levels. For this reason, more comparative research in needed in order to conceptualise cross-border regionalism as a political and social process creating new spatial contexts for action. New possible political geographies of international relations must be discussed as traditional statist or neo-liberal approaches provide little assistance in addressing many of the questions generated by the phenomenon of cross-border regionalism. Are, for example, genuine transnational communities of interest emerging on a global scale that reflect local situations and local needs? Do these networks indeed represent (or potentially represent) a new dimension in governance, surmounting administrative, cognitive, cultural and physical barriers to co-operation and also producing tangible policy results? Or, is cross-border regionalism rather a promotional exercise and a symbolic gesture of regional identity or even, in certain cases, an opportunistic strategy for obtaining public subsidies?

In synthesising the case studies presented here, Table 1 indicates how a constructivist perspective might help relate cross-border regionalism to economic, political and cultural variables at different spatial levels and to discern patterns of transnational "region-building". Moreover, this perspective might shed light on how regionalist agendas and co-operation strategies evolve in response to internal (i.e. local) and external (i.e. national, global) pressures. This scheme, focusing on cognitive, discursive and material categories can, of course, only provide a very general framework for possible integrative approaches to the study of cross-border regionalism.

Lubin has stated that "The great amount of time, resources, and commitment that cohabiting adjacent states and provinces must mobilise to adequately cope with the consequences of globalisation underlines the need for loose cross-border mechanisms to enable the semi-sovereign member governments to dialogue and co-operate with one another for limited purposes" (Lubin, 1993:162-163). Contradictions notwithstanding, we can assume that subnational diplomacy will continue to develop in complexity and geographic extension - a fact that undoubtedly will have impacts on the nation-state in its own management of international affairs. Perhaps the future of border regions, and particularly of peripheral border regions, in Europe should be interpreted from a pragmatic standpoint and based an assessment of what Euroregions actually do contribute rather that what they might achieve under ideal circumstances.